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 A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW:  
CHANGING THE PARADIGM OF FOREIGN 




hat do voting machines and ports have in common? Surpris-
ingly, both may implicate vital national security considerations.1 
In 2006, congressional concerns and public outcry precipitated investiga-
tions into the foreign ownership of ports and voting machines, a little 
anticipated consequence of increased concerns about national security 
following the events of September 11, 2001 that will test American 
commitment to its historic policy of open borders in foreign investment.2 
In March 2006, the proposed acquisition of a British company, Penin-
sular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. (P&O), by Dubai Ports World 
(DPW), a company owned by the government of Dubai in the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), brought a little known inter-agency committee, 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), to 
the “intersection of the global economy and the war on terrorism.”3 Un-
der the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, CFIUS reviews pro-
posed foreign direct investment (FDI) within the framework of U.S. open 
investment policy, providing the President with a basis to restrict FDI 
where necessary to protect national security.4 Following the World Trade 
                                                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller et al., Threats and Responses: The Reaction; Panel 
Saw No Security Issue In Port Contract, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1; 
Tim Golden, U.S. Investigates Voting Machines’ Venezuela Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2006, at A11. 
 2. The acquisition of a British company involved in producing U.S. military aircraft 
and tanks by Dubai International Capital, a company based in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), failed to elicit similar concerns. Robert McMahon, The Chill After the Ports 
Storm, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, May 23, 2006, www.cfr.org/publication 
/10755/chill_after_the_ports_storm.html. 
 3. Bill Spindle et al., In Ports Furor, a Clash over Dubai, WALL ST. J. Feb. 23, 
2006, at A1. Shoe-bomber Richard Reid was a British citizen, yet no objections were 
raised that a British company operated U.S. ports. Eben Kaplan, The UAE Purchase of 
American Port Facilities, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 21, 2006, 
www.cfr.org/publication9918/uae_purchase_of_american_port_facilities.htm [hereinafter 
Kaplan, UAE Purchase]. 
 4. The President’s authority to investigate the effects on national security of merg-
ers, acquisitions, and takeovers is limited to those that “could result in foreign control of 
persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170. 
See, e.g., Bumiller et al., supra note 1. 
W
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Center attacks of September 11, 2001, investigations revealed the vul-
nerability of domestic infrastructure like airports, bridges, and ports to 
terrorist attack.5 The acquisition of P&O would have given DPW, and 
through it, the government of Dubai, ownership of port leases at six ma-
jor U.S. cities.6 A media furor ensued, highlighting the concern that for-
eign ownership of domestic infrastructure itself represented a national 
security concern. Over twenty bills were introduced in Congress to ad-
dress the threat to national security represented by direct foreign invest-
ment in the United States.7 Two separate bills passed in the House and 
Senate respectively contain the framework for reform of the current regu-
latory regime, which centers power of review in CFIUS.8 
CFIUS emerged more recently in the context of a controversy regard-
ing foreign ownership of Smartmatic, a leading manufacturer of U.S. 
electronic voting machines. In this case, CFIUS reviewed the 2005 ac-
quisition of Sequoia Voting Systems, a Californian company, by Smart-
matic, a privately held Venezuelan company.9 The swathe of business 
interests implicated in a foreign investment review process that sweeps 
both ports and voting machines into its purview elicits questions as to 
what we are trying to protect, and from whom. 
This Note argues that the current regulatory scheme is preferable to the 
proposed legislative reform because the existing regime has been suc-
cessful in maintaining the primacy of traditional U.S. open investment 
policy without compromising national security. The DPW and Smart-
matic deals nonetheless reveal a central problem with the existing para-
digm: the lack of public and congressional confidence that CFIUS has 
conducted an effective review. Three central issues emerge from this 
common problem. First, congressional oversight is required to ensure 
CFIUS abides by its implementing legislation. Second, enhanced con-
gressional oversight may be necessary to protect transactions from un-
                                                                                                                                  
 5. See generally OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_ 
hls.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY]. 
 6. Audrey Hudson, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Terminals Remains Unknown, 
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A9. 
 7. ALAN P. LARSON & DAVID M. MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT No. 18, 25 (2006) 
[hereinafter LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT]; Greg Simmons, Foreign In-
vestment Still a Concern for Congress, FOX NEWS, May 4, 2006, http://www.fox 
news.com/story/0,2933,194186,00.html. 
 8. National Security Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened Transparency 
Act, H.R. 5337, 109th Cong. (2006); Foreign Investment and National Security Act, S. 
3549, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 9. Golden, supra note 1. 
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necessary political and public controversy. Third, although the CFIUS 
review process proceeds ad hoc, its reviews of specific transactions 
nonetheless reveal larger security vulnerabilities. Enhanced congres-
sional oversight, properly delimited, could provide the opportunity to 
draft tailored legislation to meet the security risks thus exposed while 
allowing individual transactions to proceed. While the proposed legisla-
tive reform, to some extent, might accomplish these objectives, it does so 
at the risk of deterring foreign investment while rendering CFIUS less 
effective. Instead, to ensure that the United States continues to benefit 
from FDI, congressional oversight must be limited to the extent neces-
sary to address these problems. 
Prefatory to the analysis of the existing and proposed legislation, Part 
II of this Note reviews the interrelation between foreign investment pol-
icy and national security, and in Part III, the facts and circumstances of 
the DPW and Smartmatic transactions. Part IV articulates two different 
models for the regulation of FDI, using the existing and proposed legisla-
tion as examples. The analysis demonstrates that the existing paradigm 
provides a better result by favoring open investment over national secu-
rity concerns and reveals, through application of the proposed paradigm 
to the facts of the DPW and Smartmatic transactions, that the proposed 
paradigm sacrifices open investment policy with little tangible security 
benefit. Part V identifies the key problems with the existing paradigm 
that emerge from this analysis, and proposes an alternative strategy more 
consistent with the traditional open investment policy of the United 
States while taking into account the evolving challenges of national secu-
rity. 
II. COMPETING VALUES: OPEN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
U.S. economic policy traditionally emphasizes the importance of open 
investment; in fact, much of the United States’ current preeminence and 
past development may be attributed to its historically liberal policy re-
garding foreign investment.10 Conventional wisdom maintains that in-
creasing the interrelation of different economies unites disparate national 
interests and promotes stability.11 At the same time, encouraging FDI in 
                                                                                                                                  
 10. Gerald T. Nowak, Note, Above All, Do No Harm: The Application of the Exon-
Florio Amendment to Dual-Use Technologies, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1002, 1014 (1992) 
(noting that the Erie Canal and the Louisiana Purchase were both financed by foreign 
capital). 
 11. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 6; Eben Kaplan, 
Foreign Ownership of U.S. Infrastructure, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 13, 
2007,http://www.cfr.org/publication/10092/foreign_ownership_of_us_infrastructure.html 
[hereinafter Kaplan, Foreign Ownership]; see also UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
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the United States creates reciprocal opportunities for U.S. companies 
abroad.12 Foreign investment helps fuel robust growth in the U.S. econ-
omy by providing capital to finance demands for investment that exceed 
the domestic economy’s supply.13 Foreign companies in the United 
States produce a significant percentage of U.S. exports and jobs.14 In ad-
dition, foreign dollars spent in the United States on research and devel-
opment contribute to the modernization and development of valuable 
products and technology15 or enable a particular company or corporate 
division to continue operating in the United States.16 
Within this context, new national security concerns emerged following 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. 
Citing the modern transformation of business and government operations 
and their shared interdependence on “critical physical and information 
                                                                                                                                  
ACCOUNTING OFFICE [GAO], FOREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS IN THE BANKING, 
PETROLEUM, CHEMICALS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTORS, GAO/NSIAD-90-129, 4 (May 
30, 1990) (arguing that “foreign investments . . . should encourage increased stability by 
linking the economic interests of . . . countries with those of the United States”) [herein-
after GAO May 1990]; GAO, CONTROLLING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NATIONAL 
INTEREST SECTORS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY, GAO/ID-77-18, 38 (Oct. 7, 1977) [hereinafter 
GAO Oct. 1977]; Davis B. Bobrow & Robert T. Kudrle, Economic Interdependence and 
Security: U.S. Trade and Investment Policy for a New Era, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 61, 
77 (1994) (pointing out that foreign investment is more important for high technology 
sectors of the U.S. economy than other parts). 
 12. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 11; see also Bobrow & Kudrle, supra 
note 11, at 77. 
 13. JAMES K. JACKSON, FINANCING THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE [CRS] RL33274, 11 (Feb. 14, 2006) (“foreign capital inflows are 
needed to fill the gap between the demand for capital in the economy and the domestic 
supply of capital”); CRAIG ELWELL, THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND CURES, CRS RL31032, 5 (Aug. 12, 2004).  
It is an economic identity that the amount of investment undertaken by an 
economy will be equal to the amount of saving—that is, the portion of current 
income not used for consumption—that is available to finance investment. But 
for a nation, this identity can be satisfied through the use of both domestic and 
foreign saving, or, domestic and foreign investment. 
Id. 
 14. The trade deficit was in excess of $725 billion in 2005. Foreign companies pro-
vide 5.3 million American jobs (often with higher wages than U.S. jobs) and produce 
twenty-one percent of U.S. exports. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 12. The U.S. 
trade deficit last year widened more than seventeen percent from the previous year, and 
the only way to finance this deficit is by attracting foreign investment. Bernard Wysocki, 
Jr. et al., Port Debate Exposes Conflicts Between Security Needs and Foreign Investment, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A1. 
 15. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 7. 
 16. See id. at 22. 
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infrastructures,” Congress enacted the Critical Infrastructures Protection 
Act of 2001.17 Critical infrastructure “means systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or de-
struction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or 
any combination of those matters.”18 This definition is the linchpin for 
subsequent homeland security and national defense legislation.19 In the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the White House emphasized 
two axes of security vulnerability: infrastructure that delivers critical 
functions or services and the complex interdependency between them 
such that a successful attack at any point in these systems can reverberate 
throughout.20 Threats include those presented by the privileged access of 
employees to information on “vulnerabilities, operations, and protective 
measures” for critical infrastructure or direct facilitation of attacks 
through provision of access to sensitive areas like loading docks, control 
centers, and airport tarmacs.21 
Following the DPW deal, these broad national security concerns pre-
cipitated a reexamination of the nature and role of FDI in the United 
States.22 Although Congress empowered the executive branch with broad 
authority in situations of national emergency,23 the emergency powers do 
not apply extraterritorially.24 Furthermore, foreign firms within the 
United States and abroad may be subject to influence by their home 
country governments or may suffer security breaches compromising sen-
                                                                                                                                  
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(a) & (b). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 
 19. See generally NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 5. The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security identifies agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, 
government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, trans-
portation, banking and finance, chemical industry, postal, and shipping sectors as critical 
infrastructure. Id. at 29–30. 
 20. See id. at 30. 
 21. Id. at 34. 
 22. This Note uses the definition of foreign direct investment (FDI) provided in 15 
C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1), which states that FDI is “the ownership or control, directly or indi-
rectly, by one foreign person of ten per centum or more of the voting securities of an 
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. 
business enterprise . . . .” 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1). 
 23. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1917); International 
Emergency Economy Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (1976); see Bobrow & 
Kudrle, supra note 11, at 80 (commenting that “the U.S. government has legal means to 
assure supply even from a foreign monopolist when its operations are located in the 
United States . . . the special emergency measures do not apply when the source of in-
vestment is located outside U.S. jurisdiction”). 
 24. Bobrow & Kudrle, supra 11, at 80. 
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sitive U.S. information.25 The view that these risks warrant regulation of 
FDI in the United States reflects an underlying assumption that foreign 
companies, unlike U.S. companies, operate under competing interests 
that may undermine their compliance with U.S. laws and security.26 With 
respect to the DPW transaction in particular, this view took concrete 
form when critics of the deal articulated concerns that Dubai’s ports were 
a conduit for black market nuclear technology, that terrorists used Du-
bai’s financial centers to circumvent U.S. economic sanctions and funnel 
funds, and that some September 11 terrorists were UAE citizens.27 
The interrelationship between FDI and national security presents a di-
lemma: allow foreign ownership and tolerate an unquantifiable risk to 
national security or restrict foreign ownership and tolerate reduced capi-
tal and attendant business difficulties for U.S. firms.28 Balanced against 
favoring the national security concern in this relationship is that the 
United States plays a significant role in defining global economic pol-
icy.29 Tightening the reins on foreign investment in the United States 
may well reinforce isolationist urges elsewhere, with long-term conse-
quences to American interests at home and abroad.30 Given the intercon-
nectedness of critical infrastructure,31 greater security may require at-
tracting foreign firms, not only because they provide expertise and capi-
tal, but because U.S. security depends on reciprocal security arrange-
ments with both private and government owned and operated infrastruc-
ture worldwide.32 
Striking the right balance between the competing values of open in-
vestment and national security remains especially important because ex-
amination of the data on foreign investment suggests that the United 
States has not used FDI as a vehicle for aligning foreign interests with its 
                                                                                                                                  
 25. Id.; LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
 26. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 12; LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 9. 
 27. Spindle et al., supra note 3; Bill Spindle & Yasmine El-Rashidi, In Quest to Build 
A Financial Center, Hurdles for Dubai, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at A1; Lawrence 
Lindsey, Not For Sale to Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2006, at A18. 
 28. See GAO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS, 
GAO/NSIAD-90-94, 26 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter GAO Mar. 1990]. 
 29. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 6. 
 30. See, e.g., id.; McMahon, supra note 2; Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Op-Ed., You Can’t 
Be CFIUS, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2006, at A8. 
 31. Electricity, petroleum pipelines, trade, and the global transportation system are 
examples. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 35. 
 32. Ports and airports are examples of critical infrastructure that present a curious 
mixture of state and private interests both in the United States and worldwide. LARSON & 
MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 31. 
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own with equal consistency or success in all countries.33 Although ninety 
percent of foreign investment in the United States derives from members 
of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),34 
the vast majority of that investment originates in countries that are al-
ready U.S. allies.35 In contrast, investments originating in the Middle 
East represent a small percentage of FDI in the U.S. economy, even 
though Middle Eastern countries are a significant destination of Ameri-
can goods and American FDI.36 In 2004, Middle Eastern countries in-
vested a relatively small $192 million in hard U.S. assets, but Middle 
East oil exporters also held $121.1 billion in U.S. securities, providing an 
untapped resource for investment in hard U.S. assets.37 Similarly, Vene-
zuela is a relatively insignificant percentage of FDI in the U.S. econ-
omy,38 although American investment represents fifty-three percent of 
FDI in Venezuela.39 The investments, valued at approximately $10.8 bil-
lion, are diversified among petroleum, telecommunications, manufactur-
ing, and finance sectors. The United States relies heavily on Venezuela 
                                                                                                                                  
 33. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 34. The OECD is the successor to the organization created to administer aid under the 
Marshall Plan following World War II. Today the organization is dedicated to the main-
tenance and development of free market economies. There are currently thirty member 
states, including the United States. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, ABOUT OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_201185_ 
1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited May 27, 2007). The majority of foreign investment is in 
liquid assets; in 2004, “foreigners held $1.9 trillion in U.S. corporate stocks, $2.2 trillion 
in government securities, $2.1 trillion in private bonds and $2.9 trillion in debt . . . ac-
cording to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis . . . $2.7 trillion . . 
. is invested in hard assets.” Wysocki, Jr. et al., supra note 14. Insofar as there are risks 
associated with liquid holdings in the United States that stem from the destabilizing ef-
fects of sudden withdrawals, increasing physical holdings of foreign firms provides bal-
last in the form of “a more permanent stake in the health of the U.S. economy.” LARSON 
& MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 23. 
 35. The greater percentage of foreign investment in the United States comes from the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 
2005 and UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006 available at 
www.unctad.org/fdistatistics; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: 
UNITED KINGDOM, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm (last visited May 27, 2007). 
 36. MARY JANE BOLLE, MIDDLE EAST FREE TRADE AREA: PROGRESS REPORT, CRS 
RL32638, 5–7 (2006). 
 37. These numbers exclude Israel. Wysocki, Jr. et al., supra note 14. 
 38. Venezuelan FDI totals $5.5 billion, compared with $252 billion from the United 
Kingdom. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63553.htm (last visited May 27, 2007). 
 39. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, VENEZUELA 2005 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT, 
www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/43503.html (last visited May 27, 2007), U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: VENEZUELA, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm 
(last visited May 27, 2007). 
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for its oil needs, and the United States trade deficit is on the rise, weigh-
ing in at $19.5 billion in 2004.40 This data, which shows a vast untapped 
pool of foreign capital, suggests that by shifting the balance in favor of 
national security so as to preclude investment from countries like the 
UAE or Venezuela, the United States would lose a significant opportu-
nity to increase economic interdependence, align foreign interests with 
its own, and thereby improve national security. 
The controversy that emerged regarding the DPW and Smartmatic 
deals are manifestations of the tension between traditional open invest-
ment policy and increased national security concerns.41 Insofar as FDI 
increases stability, and hence, security, by aligning national interests, the 
chilly reception of DPW, the retroactive scrutiny of the Smartmatic deal, 
and the proposed legislative reform fires a clear shot across the bow to 
foreign investors and may well discourage future investments.42 
III. THE DILEMMA IN ACTION: DUBAI PORTS WORLD AND SMARTMATIC 
TRANSACTIONS  
A. Dubai Ports World 
DPW is part of Ports Customs & Freezone Corp., a company owned by 
the government of Dubai.43 The company first entered the world stage 
with the acquisition of the port facilities of CSX Corporation of Jackson-
ville, Florida, a U.S. company that had no ownership interests in U.S. 
ports, but the acquisition of which expanded DPW’s existing reach in the 
Middle East and India to include ports in China.44 DPW cited its expan-
sion as commercially motivated as part of a larger trend to global con-
                                                                                                                                  
 40. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: VENEZUELA, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm (last visited May 27, 2007) (Venezuela is 
one of the United States’ four major foreign sources of oil); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
VENEZUELA 2005 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT, www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/ 
43503.html (last visited May 27, 2007). 
 41. See discussion infra Part III. 
 42. See, e.g., LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 6 (noting 
that “both . . . economic health . . . and . . . long term security depend on . . . a welcoming 
environment”); W. Robert Shearer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legisla-
tion Susceptible to Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1746–53 (1993) (discussing FDI and 
its role in building a robust economy, which itself provides national security, and advo-
cating a total repeal of the review process to avoid discouraging FDI). 
 43. The government of Dubai is one of seven emirates that joined to form the UAE in 
1971. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5444.htm (last visited May 27, 2007); Spindle et al., 
supra note 3. 
 44. Spindle et al., supra note 3. 
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solidation in the shipping and ports business.45 The primary focus of 
DPW’s attempt to acquire the British company, P&O, was to expand op-
erations in China and India, thus complementing the geographic distribu-
tion of existing operations.46 Although a company spokesperson stated 
that “[t]he U.S. is not the focus of the acquisition,”47 the acquisition of 
P&O would give DPW control over terminals in six U.S. ports previ-
ously operated by the British company.48 
The seventh largest port operator in the world, DPW operates in four-
teen countries, provides support to U.S. military in Germany, Djibouti, 
and Dubai, and has been recognized for its high standards of port opera-
tion.49 The senior management is composed of three citizens of the 
United States, one of Great Britain, two of India, one of the Netherlands, 
and four of Dubai. Of the four citizens of Dubai, two were educated at 
American universities.50 The acquisition of P&O Ports North America, 
the U.S. operations of P&O, represented merely six to ten percent of the 
overall transaction; three of the leases to be acquired were joint ventures 
with U.S. companies.51 
Critics of the deal issued statements in the press, precipitating a media 
uproar. Typically, reports focused on internal threats presented by the 
deal, citing UAE ties to terrorism, such that a UAE company operating 
U.S. ports would provide a conduit for terrorists to transport operatives 
and weapons to the United States.52 While media reports and congres-
                                                                                                                                  
 45. Testimony Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (State-
ment of H. Edward Bilkey, Chief Operating Officer, Dubai Ports World), 
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bilkey-022806.pdf [hereinafter Bilkey, Testimony]. 
 46. Spindle et al., supra note 3. 
 47. Id. (quoting the Dubai Ports World spokesperson). 
 48. DPW’s bid would affect operation of 850 port terminals in U.S. cities, including 
New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, New Orleans, Miami, and Philadelphia. See Hudson, 
supra note 6. 
 49. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 1–2. 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. Id. at 2–3. The specific leases acquired are for port terminals located in Baltimore; 
Philadelphia, which was a fifty-fifty joint venture with Stevedoring Services of America; 
Miami, which was a fifty percent stake in Port of Miami Terminal Operating Company; 
New Orleans; and Newark, a fifty-fifty joint venture in the Port of Newark Container 
Terminal with Maersk Terminals. There were additional general stevedoring and cargo 
handling operations at additional locations and a passenger terminal in New York. Id. 
The $6.8 billion deal involved ports in eighteen countries. Q&A: U.S. Row Over Dubai 
Ports, BBC NEWS, Mar. 9 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4789368.stm [here-
inafter BBC NEWS, Q&A]. 
 52. Critics specifically cited that two airplane hijackers involved in the 2001 World 
Trade Center attacks were from the UAE and that terrorist groups used the UAE a base of 
operations. Critics also emphasized that UAE is a primarily Arab and Muslim state. Kap-
lan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Op-Ed., A Salute to Bush for 
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sional statements inflamed public concerns, parties challenged the acqui-
sition in courts in Great Britain, Florida, and New Jersey; all claims were 
rejected or rendered nugatory by subsequent developments.53 
DPW contacted CFIUS to discuss the planned acquisition on October 
17, 2005, and within two weeks, CFIUS engaged in an extensive pre-
liminary review of the proposed transaction.54 Official CFIUS review 
commenced on December 15, 2005.55 Following its review, CFIUS rec-
ommended measures that would mitigate the national security concerns 
represented by the deal. Concessions included advance notice to the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) for changes in security arrange-
ments, assignation of management of U.S. facilities to U.S. citizens, and 
the provision of confidential records relating to port management and 
employees without a subpoena.56 DPW consented to the terms, and on 
January 17, 2006, CFIUS issued a formal letter allowing the acquisition 
                                                                                                                                  
Standing Against Port Takeover Storm, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=602. 
 53. A federal judge rejected New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine’s request for an inves-
tigation and permission to inspect the documents submitted to CFIUS. Eller & Co, a ste-
vedoring company in the Miami-Dade ports, attempted to block the takeover claiming 
that their business would be harmed by American retaliation if an Arab company were 
allowed to operate its ports. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey filed suit in 
New Jersey state court to block the take over of operations at Port Newark. The plaintiffs 
sought relief on grounds that the landlord failed to seek approval of the tenants as re-
quired by the thirty year lease, emphasizing that as owners they needed to be “comfort-
able that whoever operates it is capable of it.” They also alleged that the federal govern-
ment had provided inadequate assurances about security issues. See Ports Deal News 
Tracker, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2006, Mar. 1, 2006, & Mar. 2, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114071649414581503.html. 
 54. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 5. 
 55. Id. at 6. This sequence of events reflects standard operating practice for CFIUS. 
The governing statute imposes a short time-line for review, so a given transaction is ex-
tensively discussed before “official notice” is filed, triggering formal review and the 
statutory clock. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.401. 
 56. Specifically, DPW conceded it would: 1) maintain current levels of membership 
and cooperation in security arrangements; 2) provide DHS with thirty days advance no-
tice of change in membership or cooperation in security arrangements; 3) operate U.S. 
facilities to the extent possible with current U.S. management; 4) designate a responsible 
corporate officer to serve as point of contact with the DHS on security matters; 5) provide 
relevant information promptly to DHS upon request; 6) assist and support law enforce-
ment agencies (including disclosing information on the design, manufacture and opera-
tion of U.S. facilities); and 7) provide records relating to foreign operation direction, if 
any, of the U.S. facilities. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 6–7; Robert Block, Cher-
toff Says U.S. Ports Takeover Would Tighten Grip on Security, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 
2006, at A3; Greg Hitt, White House Cites Extra Safeguards in Ports Deal, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 23, 2006, at A3. 
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to proceed.57 Following the media uproar, CFIUS, with the cooperation 
of DPW and P&O, commenced a second-stage extended investigation, 
which resulted in additional security concessions, including an interim 
agreement between DPW and P&O to permit the management and con-
trol of the North American operation to continue without direction or 
control from DPW until May 1, 2006 or until final approval of the trans-
action.58 As furor over the deal refused to abate, DPW made additional 
unprecedented concessions: to install state-of-the-art radiation and 
gamma ray inspection devices at all current and future U.S. and foreign 
ports managed by DPW at company expense (estimated $100 million 
cost); to grant the DHS a right to veto the choice of chief executive, 
board members, security officials, and all senior officers; and to create a 
supermajority of U.S. citizens on the board of directors.59 DPW ulti-
mately responded to American concerns by divesting its leases to Ameri-
can ports.60 
B. Smartmatic 
The transaction at issue in the Smartmatic controversy is its acquisition 
of Sequoia Voting Systems (SVS), completed in March 2005.61 Unlike 
P&O, the target of the DPW acquisition, SVS is an American company 
based in California that has provided voting equipment nationwide since 
the 1890s.62 Smartmatic is privately held, with ninety-seven percent 
owned by four Venezuelan founders.63 It owes its recent rise to a series 
of voting contracts with the government of Venezuela, the first of which 
was awarded in 2004, the year Hugo Chávez was confirmed President of 
Venezuela by popular referendum.64 The company, in conjunction with 
Bizta, another small start-up, won contracts from American competi-
tors.65 The proceeds from those contracts allowed Smartmatic to acquire 
                                                                                                                                  
 57. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 7. 
 58. Id. at 7–8. 
 59. DPW also volunteered to maintain all records relating to security operations on 
U.S. soil available on request and to establish a Security and Financial Oversight Board 
chaired by American citizens reporting annually to the DHS. Neil King, Jr., DP World 
Tried to Soothe U.S. Waters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2006, at A4. 
 60. BBC NEWS, Q&A, supra note 51. 
 61. Alphonso Chardy, U.S. Digs for Vote-Machine Links to Hugo Chávez, MIAMI 
HERALD, Oct. 28, 2006, at A1. 
 62. Press Release, Sequoia Voting Systems, Sequoia Voting Systems Responds to 
Venezuela-Related Rumors and Misinformation (May 11, 2006), http://www.sequoia 
vote.com/article.php?id=74. 
 63. Chardy, supra note 61. 
 64. Golden, supra note 1. 
 65. Id. 
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SVS as part of a larger global sales and marketing plan to establish its 
leadership in electronic voting worldwide.66 Following acquisition by 
Smartmatic, SVS’s sales spiked, and its machines were used in sixteen 
states in 2006.67 
Smartmatic, originally a single office headquartered in Florida, just 
prior to its acquisition of SVS, reincorporated in an elaborate structure of 
holding companies; critics pointed to this as evidence of the company’s 
attempt to obfuscate its ownership.68 In addition, Bizta, an entirely sepa-
rate company, obtained a loan from the Venezuelan government, which 
received a twenty-eight percent stake in Bizta as guarantee and pursuant 
to which the Venezuelan government appointed a senior official to the 
company’s board of directors.69 According to critics, because two mem-
bers of the Bizta board are also on the board of Smartmatic, the Venezue-
lan government could exert influence over Smartmatic,70 even though the 
loan to Bizta was discharged in 2004 before Smartmatic bought Bizta in 
2005.71 
Thus, critics, citing concerns that the Venezuelan government may be 
able to wield influence over American elections by virtue of its connec-
tions to Smartmatic, brought the acquisition to the attention of President 
Bush in May 2006.72 On October 29, 2006, Smartmatic and SVS issued a 
press release announcing they had voluntarily notified CFIUS, and had 
submitted information regarding ownership and security of their voting 
products for review.73 In the same release, the company clarified that 
                                                                                                                                  
 66. Id. 
 67. Bob Davis, Smartmatic to Shed U.S. Unit, End Probe into Venezuelan Links, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2006, at A6 (also noting that the Justice Department had conducted 
an investigation into whether Smartmatic paid bribes to Venezuelan officials to win the 
2004 election contract). 
 68. The holding companies were set up in in trusts based in Delaware, the Nether-
lands, and the Caribbean. Golden, supra note 1. 
 69. Davis, supra note 67. 
 70. Golden, supra note 1. 
 71. Davis supra note 67. 
 72. See Golden, supra note 1. 
 73. Press Release, Sequoia Voting Systems, Smartmatic and Sequoia Voting Systems 
Announce Voluntary CFIUS Filing (Oct. 29, 2006), http://www.sequoia 
vote.com/article.php?id=79 (the press release identified three entrepreneurs as the pri-
mary owners: Antonio Mugica, with 78.8%; Alfredo Anzola, with 3.87%; and Roger 
Pinate, with 8.47%) [hereinafter SVS Oct. 29, 2006 Press Release]. In contrast, Represen-
tative Maloney asserted in a press release that: 
[w]hen I first raised this case with Treasury, I thought that it was ripe for a 
CFIUS investigation, because the integrity of our voting machines is vital to 
national security. At that time, Smartmatic flatly refused to undergo a CFIUS 
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“[n]o foreign government or entity—including Venezuela—has ever held 
an ownership stake in Smartmatic.”74 Subsequently, on December 22, 
2006, Smartmatic obtained CFIUS approval to withdraw from the review 
process, and announced plans to sell SVS.75 As with the DPW ports deal, 
the Sequoia voting machines became the subject of litigation when a suit 
was brought against New Jersey elections officials alleging that “the state 
did not properly certify the machines and that the equipment could not 
adequately protect against vote fraud.”76 
While the DPW controversy should be viewed in light of domestic 
concerns regarding port security following the events of September 11, 
2001, concerns regarding the Smartmatic transaction must be viewed in 
light of the vocal hostility of the Chávez government to the Bush admini-
stration, partisan voting controversies following Bush v. Gore,77 and lar-
ger policy concerns regarding the security and integrity of electronic vot-
ing systems.78 
                                                                                                                                  
review. But . . . the company could not overcome the cloud of doubt . . . had 
they been able to, we would not be talking about a sale of Sequoia today. 
Press Release, Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), Smartmatic Announces It Will Sell Se-
quoia Voting Systems, Withdraw from CFIUS Review (Dec. 22, 2006), 
http://maloney.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1255&Itemid
=61 [hereinafter Maloney Press Release]. 
 74. SVS Oct. 29, 2006 Press Release, supra note 73. 
 75. N.Y. TIMES, Voting Machine Maker for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at A17 
(quoting Sequoia officials that the controversy would have no effect on the company’s 
role in U.S. elections); Press Release, Sequoia Voting Systems, Smartmatic Corporation 
and Sequoia Voting Systems Move to Align Corporate Structures with Future Business 
Goals (Dec. 22, 2006), http://www.sequoiavote.com/article.php?id=82 (noting that the 
U.S. Election Assistance Commission had not raised any concerns regarding the use of 
the company’s products in the 2006 elections, that the products met the highest industry 
standards, and that the products had passed “extensive federal and state testing”). 
 76. Richard G. Jones, Proof Sought on Reliability of Vote Units, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2007, at B4. 
 77. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Ian Urbina, U.S. Panel is Said to Alter Finding 
on Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, at A1. 
 78. The GAO issued a 2007 report documenting security problems in voting systems, 
the latest in a series of reports since 2001. GAO, ELECTIONS: ALL LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM CHALLENGES, 
GAO-07-576T (Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Mar. 7, 2007). Most recently, the stand-
off between the United States and Venezuela was demonstrated when President Chávez 
called President Bush “the devil” at the United Nations and Venezuela’s challenge to the 
U.S. nomination of Guatemala to the United Nations Security Council. Warren Hoge, 
Venezuelan’s Diatribe Seen as Fatal to U.N. Council Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at 
A6; After 41 U.N. Ballots, Venezuela-Guatemala Logjam Persists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 
2006, at A12; see also Michael Isikoff & Joseph Contreras, Ortega and Ollie—Again, 
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2006, at 9 (observing that the Bush administration is concerned 
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IV. CHANGING THE PARADIGM 
Following the Dubai Port World deal in 2006, two bills emerged as key 
contenders for CFIUS reform. Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama pro-
posed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2006 (S. 
3549), which passed the Senate with unanimous consent.79 A second bill, 
the National Security Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened 
Transparency Act of 2006 (H.R. 5337), sponsored by Representative Roy 
Blunt of Missouri, passed the House with near unanimous approval.80 
Both seek to amend the Exon-Florio and CFIUS review process encapsu-
lated in the Defense Production Act of 1950 and related executive orders. 
The way the current law and the proposed bill structure the CFIUS in-
quiry reflect two different views regarding the proper framework for 
analysis of risks presented by FDI. The paradigm reflected in the existing 
law may be characterized as a totality of the circumstances test, whereas 
the changes proposed in the Senate bill introduce a minimum threshold 
analysis. In the former, the significance of any one factor is weighed 
against the entire situation presented by the transaction. In the latter, cer-
tain types of activity and contacts trigger heightened scrutiny to deter-
mine if they are substantial enough to suggest impairment of national 
security. The differences between these two approaches reflect a funda-
mental shift in the relative primacy of open investment versus national 
security in the review process. 
A. The Current FDI Review Process: The Totality of the Circumstances 
Paradigm 
The principle inquiry in the existing Exon-Florio review process, 
which was first established in 197581 and expanded by Congress in 
1988,82 is triggered by voluntary notice from parties to a transaction.83 
                                                                                                                                  
Venezuelan President Chávez may be lending financial support to the re-election of ex-
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua). 
 79. Foreign Investment and National Security Act, S. 3549, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 80. National Security Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened Transparency 
Act, H.R. 5337, 109th Cong. (2006) 
 81. President Gerald Ford created CFIUS by executive order in 1975, but the execu-
tive branch had no authority to interfere in FDI aside from the President’s powers to de-
clare a national emergency or if regulatory authority under federal antitrust, environ-
mental or securities laws. International Emergency Economic Powers, 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1701–1706; Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 F.R. 20,263 (May 7, 1975). 
 82. The review process in present form derives from a 1988 amendment to § 721 of 
the Defense Production Act (1950), the so-called Exon-Florio Amendment, which ex-
panded presidential authority to block foreign acquisitions that threatened national secu-
rity and formalized the CFIUS review process, which had proceeded on an informal basis 
pursuant to an executive order. The President delegated the authority granted him by the 
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Individual CFIUS members may also notify the committee of a transac-
tion.84 CFIUS, originally consisting of six members, has expanded to its 
present membership of twelve representatives of different departments 
and offices of the executive branch.85 
In the two-prong inquiry, CFIUS must first determine whether there is 
credible evidence that a foreign person acquiring control may take action 
that threatens to impair national security and second, whether existing 
laws, other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, provide the President insufficient authority to protect na-
tional security in the matter before the President.86 No particularized 
definition of “national security” was provided; legislators deliberately 
left the term to interpretation so as to ensure it would not be delimited by 
industry.87 
Although notice is voluntary, consequences for failing to file are severe 
because failure to secure CFIUS approval or to fully disclose or to mis-
represent in the process subjects the transaction to divestiture if at any 
                                                                                                                                  
1988 Exon-Florio Amendment to CFIUS via executive order. The Defense Production 
Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,661, 40 F.R. 779 (Dec. 
27, 1988); see generally JAMES K. JACKSON, THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL SECURITY TEST 
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT, CRS 22197, 2 (Feb. 23, 2006) (providing an overview of the 
legislative and regulatory history) [hereinafter JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST]. 
 83. 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (voluntary notice by a party to a transaction). The De-
partment of Treasury first promulgated guidelines in 1991. See JACKSON, NATIONAL 
SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 4. 
 84. 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(b). 
 85. Executive departments represented on CFIUS include: Department of Treasury 
(Chair), Department of Commerce, Department of State, Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense. Executive offices of the 
President represented on CFIUS include: Office of Management and Budget, Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, National Security Council, and the National Economic Council. See 
Saxton, Committee Report, supra note 86. 
 86. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e); see also Jim Saxton, Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE RESEARCH REPORT 109-34, Mar. 2006, 
available at www.house.gov/jec [hereinafter Saxton, Committee Report]. Industries such 
as power, banking, maritime, and aircraft are governed by industry-specific regulation 
that imposes limitations on foreign ownership. A report to Congress by the Comptroller 
General in 1977 examined the statutory framework governing these different sectors of 
“national interest” and concluded there was no need to introduce an additional layer of 
review on the influx of foreign capital because existing legislation already specifically 
addressed the risks of foreign ownership in those industries. GAO Oct. 1977, supra note 
11, at 6–22, 38; see also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 3. 
 87. “Critical technologies” are defined, but “national security” is not. See 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 2170 (k)(2); see also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 3 (cit-
ing 134 CONG. REC. H2118 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988)). 
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time the acquisition raises security concerns.88 Compliance gives the 
transaction the benefit of a safe harbor provision, minimizing risk of sub-
sequent review or action by the President.89 
The two-prong inquiry whereby CFIUS adduces the existence of credi-
ble evidence of a threat to national security and whether existing laws 
provide the President with sufficient authority to protect national security 
governs both phases of the CFIUS process: an initial thirty-day review 
and a second-stage forty-five day investigation.90 If, upon completing the 
first-stage thirty day review, CFIUS is unable to resolve security con-
cerns with the parties to the transaction, the companies will either with-
draw notice to provide more time, or if withdrawal is not feasible either 
because the company refuses or the security risks are too great, CFIUS 
will proceed to a second stage, entailing a more extensive forty-five day 
investigation.91 At all stages of the process, CFIUS proceeds by consen-
sus; consequently, the objection of any one of the member agencies at 
the conclusion of the first-stage thirty day review triggers the second-
stage forty-five day investigation, and upon conclusion of the investiga-
tion, if CFIUS cannot reach consensus regarding a recommended course 
                                                                                                                                  
 88. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d); 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d)–(e). 
 89. 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d). The regulation states that: 
[a]ll authority available to the President under section 721(d), including di-
vestment authority, shall remain available at the discretion of the President in 
respect of acquisitions which have been concluded at any time on or after the 
effective date, but only if the purpose for which divestment or other appropriate 
relief is sought is based on facts, conditions, or circumstances existing at the 
time the transaction was concluded. Such authority shall not be exercised if: 
(1) The Committee, through its Staff Chairman, has in writing ad-
vised a party (or the parties) that a particular transaction, with respect 
to which voluntary notice was attempted, was not subject to section 
721; 
(2) The Committee has previously determined under § 800.502 not to 
undertake an investigation of the acquisition when proposed, pend-
ing, or completed; or 
(3) The President has previously determined not to exercise his au-
thority under section 721 with respect to that acquisition. 
Id. 
 90. 50 U.S.C. § 5170(e); 31 C.F.R. § 800.501(a); see also LARSON & MARCHICK, 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 13. 
 91. A company may, provided CFIUS approves, withdraw its notice at any time prior 
to the president’s final decision. 31 C.F.R. § 800.505; see also LARSON & MARCHICK, 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 14–15. For review periods, see 31 C.F.R. § 
800.404(a) (commencing thirty day review period) and § 800.504(a) (conclusion of in-
vestigation after forty-five days). 
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of action for the President, the report to the President must represent dis-
senting views.92 
The existing law, whereby the mechanism is permissive, discretionary, 
ad hoc, and incorporates discreet reporting requirements, provides an 
example of a totality of the circumstances paradigm under which national 
security concerns are subordinated to the open investment principle. For 
example, although an investigation is required where the party acquiring 
control is a foreign government or person acting on behalf of a foreign 
government, the statute is otherwise permissive, accepting voluntary no-
tifications from parties to a transaction.93 Furthermore, Exon-Florio 
stipulates merely that CFIUS “may” consider several different factors in 
its inquiry, including the effect of the proposed investment on domestic 
production for projected national defense requirements, the consequences 
of sales of military technology to countries of concern with respect to 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the potential effects of 
the proposed transaction on U.S. defense technology leadership.94 Con-
sequently, the inquiry underlying the review and investigation entails 
consideration of both the past conduct and future intentions of the indi-
vidual investor, and to a lesser extent, the nation of origin of the invest-
                                                                                                                                  
 92. 31 C.F.R. § 800.504; LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, 
at 14. 
 93. On voluntary notice, see 31 C.F.R. § 800.601. The mandatory investigation re-
quirement concerning foreign governments was introduced by the so-called Byrd 
Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, enacted in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837(b) (1992), and codi-
fied as 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (b). See also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra 
note 82, at 3, note 11. 
 94. The statute specifically suggests consideration of:  
1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, 2) 
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense re-
quirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technol-
ogy, materials, and other supplies and services, 3) the control of domestic in-
dustries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability 
and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national security, 
4) the potential effects of the . . . transaction on the sales of military goods, 
equipment, or technology to any country (A) identified by the Secretary of 
State . . . or (B) listed under . . . the ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Special Country 
List’ . . . and 5) the potential effects of the . . . transaction on United States in-
ternational technological leadership in areas affecting United States national 
security.  
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (f); see also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 
3–4. 
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ment, but only insofar as this presents credible evidence of an impair-
ment of national security.95 
While the current law does not define national security, suggesting the 
scope of review is unlimited, in fact, the compass of these factors deline-
ate the core inquiry for CFIUS, largely limiting its purview to acquisi-
tions of controlling interests that have measurable consequences for the 
present and future capacity to meet defense production requirements.96 
At the same time, the undefined scope of national security encourages 
voluntary notification of CFIUS because where there is a question re-
garding whether or not a given transaction will implicate national secu-
rity concerns, corporations seek to benefit from the safe harbor provision 
to minimize the risk of subsequent divestment.97 Furthermore, in declin-
ing to specify national security or to articulate a mandatory list of factors 
for consideration, the current law permits CFIUS discretion to prioritize 
transactions for review and investigation, permitting it to traverse indus-
tries, formulations of management control, and chains of relationships to 
assess how, in the facts of a specific case, the transaction may implicate 
national security concerns.98 
                                                                                                                                  
 95. On the balance between consideration of past and future conduct of an investor in 
evaluating security risks, see GAO May 1990, supra note 11, at 3; GAO Mar. 1990, su-
pra note 28, at 12; GAO, NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 
GAO/T-NSIAD-91-08, 9–10 (Feb. 26, 1991) (Testimony of Allan I. Mendelowitz) [here-
inafter GAO Feb. 1991]. The Department of Treasury regulations define “control” as “the 
power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised . . . to determine, direct, take reach or 
cause decisions regarding . . . ” matters including: the transfer of principal assets; dissolu-
tion; closing or relocation of production, research, or development facilities; termination 
or non-fulfillment of contracts; and amendment of the entity’s operative agreement. The 
regulation also stipulates that where more than one foreign person has an interest, “con-
sideration will be given to factors such as whether the foreign persons are related and/or 
whether they have commitments to act in concert.” 31 C.F.R. 800.204 (a) & (b). 
 96. “They required policy judgments about the consequences of dependence on for-
eign semiconductor firms for both the U.S. civilian and military sectors. Such decisions 
would require making assumptions about the Japanese firm’s intentions regarding the 
market power and technology transfer that it would gain from the acquisition.” GAO 
Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 22 (discussing a Japanese firm’s proposed purchase of a 
U.S. semiconductor producer). 
 97. Id. at 14 (noting that failure to “provide a clear definition of national security or 
the criteria [meant] attorneys representing potential foreign investors feel compelled to 
clear most foreign investments with CFIUS before completing the transactions”); GAO 
DEFENSE TRADE: IDENTIFYING FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY 
CAN BE IMPROVED, GAO/NSIAD-00-144, 5 (June 2000) [hereinafter GAO June 2000]. 
 98. “CFIUS evaluates investment on a case-by-case basis and is able to gather exten-
sive information about the firms involved . . . CFIUS does not perform analyses of for-
eign investment by industry sector, nor does it examine other larger questions which have 
arisen in public debate.” GAO Feb. 1991, supra note 95, at 9–10. 
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In addition, specific transactions are typically approved pending im-
plementation of certain conditions, including limitations on involvement 
of an acquiring foreign party through, for example, addition of American 
citizens to the board.99 These limitations are specifically tailored to ad-
dress the security concerns of different agencies and are implemented in 
mitigation agreements. These agreements may include penalties for non-
compliance and entail obligations greater than those usually required of 
domestic companies.100 If no measures are perceived adequate to address 
the national security concerns raised by the transaction, CFIUS may rec-
ommend the President block the deal.101 
Strict requirements for confidentiality govern the review and investiga-
tion process, and as a corollary, the reporting requirements to Congress 
are limited. The statute, in its current form, requires a report to the Secre-
tary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives only 
upon the President’s final determination whether or not to take action.102 
The President’s decision-making authority is only triggered upon com-
pletion of the discretionary second-stage forty-five day investigation by 
CFIUS.103 The statute also requires a report to Congress every four years, 
which is intended to assist Congress in its oversight responsibilities by 
providing an assessment of whether the FDI activity in the prior four-
year period provides credible evidence of a coordinated state-driven 
strategy to erode U.S. critical technology leadership.104 The limited and 
                                                                                                                                  
 99. For example, the acquisition of IBM’s personal computer business by Chinese 
computer-maker Lenovo was approved provided it included additional security measures. 
See McMahon, supra note 2. Approval of the 2000 acquisition of Verio, Inc., an Internet 
service provider, by Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company was contingent upon a 
strict prohibition against Japanese government involvement; the 2003 acquisition of 
Global Crossing, Ltd. by Hong Kong Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd. and Singapore Tech-
nologies Telemedia was contingent upon the passivity of Hutchison in management be-
cause of Hutchinson’s connections to the Chinese military. Hutchinson eventually with-
drew but Technologies Telemedia proceeded based on a concession to place Americans 
on the board of Global Crossing. JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 
5. 
 100. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
 101. See 31 C.F.R. 800.504(b); LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra 
note 7, at 11–12. 
 102. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (g). Prior to the 1992 amendments, the President was only 
required to report to Congress if he exercised authority to block an acquisition. GAO, 
DEFENSE TRADE: MITIGATING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS UNDER EXON-FLORIO 
COULD BE IMPROVED, GAO-02-736, 1 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter GAO Sept. 2002]. 
 103. 31 C.F.R. § 800.504. 
 104. For example, through acquisition of U.S. companies engaged in the research, 
development, and production of critical technologies or through industrial espionage. 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (k)(1). 
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discreet nature of these reporting requirements reflects an overall empha-
sis on discretion and confidentiality. 
The totality of the circumstances paradigm reflected in the current law, 
characterized, as described above, by a voluntary, discretionary, and ad 
hoc review mechanism with limited reporting requirements, is responsive 
to the problem that threats to national security are likely to change over 
time and the nature of the threat presented by any given transaction is 
highly fact specific. The broad scope of “national security” preserves 
executive discretion to respond to these threats as they emerge.105 Simul-
taneously, the scope of the factors the statute suggests for review allows 
for effective prioritization of resources in response to these emerging 
threats. In addition, the entirely voluntary notification system avoids the 
appearance of a mandatory screening process while ensuring adequate 
review of transactions that entail security concerns.106 This is reinforced 
by a strong incentive to provide notice, because the transaction may be 
subject to divestment at any time.107 The reliance on negotiated mitiga-
tion agreements ensures that the means are narrowly tailored to the spe-
cific potential negative security consequences of a transaction while 
minimizing the risk that a particular transaction could be burdened with 
the costs of larger national security concerns.108 Finally, the strict confi-
dentiality requirements and limited reporting means reviews are, for the 
most part, safely sequestered from the political arena.109 
On the other hand, the existing regime may be criticized as under-
inclusive. Reliance on a system of voluntary notification likely results in 
under-reporting of transactions that present security risks, as some would 
                                                                                                                                  
 105. See, e.g., Alan F. Holmer, Judith H. Bello, & Jeremy O. Preiss, The Final Exon-
Florio Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment: The Final Word or Prelude to Tighter 
Controls?, 23 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 593, 609 (1992). 
 106. Id. at 595, 609–610 (observing that the open definition of national security en-
courages filing, and that the burdens are small because parties are free to consult with 
CFIUS to elicit guidance, especially in the context of large corporate transactions); 
LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 11 (discussing the “spec-
ter” of mandatory investment screening and noting that the current regime encourages 
filing if there is “any possibility that a transaction might raise national security issues”). 
 107. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (d); see also Saxton, Committee Report, supra note 86 
(noting that “compliance is very high because the President may order the divestment of a 
domestic acquisition at any time in the future if the foreign acquirer did not notify 
CFIUS”). 
 108. See, e.g., Matthew R. Byrne, Note, Protecting National Security and Promoting 
Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 890–
91, 904 (2006) (discussing benefits of mitigation agreements). 
 109. S. REP. NO. 109-264, 12 (2006); see LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 
supra note 7, at 15–17 (discussing the generally limited involvement of both the legisla-
tive and executive branches, contributing to an apolitical review process). 
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argue was the case with Smartmatic.110 Moreover, the discretionary re-
view may fail to take into account the national security implications of a 
particular transaction in its broader geo-political context, as some would 
argue was the case with DPW.111 Similarly, the high order assigned to 
confidentiality comes at the expense of congressional and public confi-
dence in the adequacy of the review.112 Finally, permissive withdrawal 
regulations may allow an end-run on the review process because CFIUS 
does not monitor drop-outs.113 This problem is replicated in the failure to 
monitor and enforce compliance with formal mitigation agreements.114 
Both instances permit a risk that deals presenting security concerns re-
main unaddressed.115 
                                                                                                                                  
 110. Maloney Press Release, supra note 73 (Rep. Maloney commenting on Smartmatic 
deal). The existing law does not always reach privately owned or smaller companies, 
which may exclude “some of the most advanced technologies being developed.” GAO 
Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 15; see also GAO June 2000, supra note 97, at 7. This report 
identified three transactions that were notified to member agencies but had not been re-
ported to CFIUS. These included a 1999 acquisition of a U.S. manufacturer of ceramic 
body armor by a German firm; a 1998 acquisition of a U.S. laser manufacturer by a 
French firm; and a 1995 acquisition of a U.S. bearing manufacturer by a Hong Kong 
firm. The ceramic body armor manufacturer and the bearing manufacturer could have 
been captured by CFIUS because the companies deal in classified products that required 
Department of Defense reporting; the laser manufacturer cancelled its defense contracts, 
and did not believe its business fell within the purview of Exon-Florio. In all three cases, 
the firms agreed to cooperate with CFIUS. Id. at 10–13. 
 111. As an example, critics of CFIUS handling of the DPW deal commented that the 
current review process does not consider the underlying conditions in the UAE and the 
company’s vulnerability to infiltration and corruption. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra 
note 3 (quoting Congressman Peter King (R-NY)). Critics also expressed concern that the 
scope of interests encompassed in national security review were limited to those parties 
about whom threatening intelligence was reported and where the acquisition would affect 
export-control technologies or classified contracts; it was not expanded to include con-
sideration of U.S. critical infrastructure. Letter from Rep. Bennie Thompson to Comptrol-
ler General David Walker, (Feb. 23, 2006), http://hsc.house.gov/about/subcommi 
tees.asp?ID=47&SubSection=0&Issue=0&DocumentType=0&PublishDate=0&subcomm
ittee=8. 
 112. S. REP. NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 2; JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, 
supra note 82, at 4. 
 113. The GAO reported that two deals were completed prior to filing with CFIUS 
where notification was withdrawn because suitable mitigation measures could not be 
agreed upon, and the companies failed to re-file. The GAO concluded “[a]s a result, po-
tential threats to national security . . . remained.” GAO Sept. 2002, supra note 102 at 2. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 12 (discussing the need for post-mitigation agreement monitoring). 
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B. The Senate Bill: The Minimum Threshold Paradigm 
Following the DPW imbroglio, the Senate sought to reform the review 
process.116 In comparison to the existing totality of the circumstances 
regime, the Senate bill effects a paradigm shift by incorporating a type of 
minimum threshold analysis under which the review mechanism is man-
datory, categorical, and incorporates expansive reporting require-
ments.117 The proposed bill retains the mandatory investigation of in-
vestments by foreign governments or on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment.118 In addition, where the transaction implicates control of critical 
infrastructure or where the security risks identified through review of an 
expanded list of factors and, in both instances, the security concerns are 
unmitigated, the bill requires CFIUS to undertake a forty-five day inves-
tigation.119 Like the existing law, the bill declines to define “national se-
curity,” and retains the core factors for consideration in review and in-
vestigation discussed above, but limits the discretion of CFIUS by mak-
ing their consideration mandatory.120 The bill also introduces new fac-
tors, including, inter alia, potential effects on critical infrastructure and 
technologies, whether the country of origin is a potential regional mili-
tary threat, and individual country assessments.121 The incorporation of 
                                                                                                                                  
 116. This has been a persistent concern with respect to the Exon-Florio review process 
and it has elicited not infrequent GAO reports. See GAO, DEFENSE TRADE: NATIONAL 
SECURITY REVIEWS OF FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S. COMPANIES COULD BE IMPROVED, 
GAO-07-661T, 8 (Mar. 23, 2007) (Statement of Ann M. Calvaresi-Barr) (discussing a 
series of GAO reports since 2000) [hereinafter GAO Mar. 2007]. 
 117. S. 3549 § 2. 
 118. The bill changes the voluntary notice provisions with regard to any transaction 
involving a foreign government and critical infrastructure by making notification of 
CFIUS in both of those circumstances mandatory, with penalties for non-compliance to 
be promulgated by CFIUS following enactment of the bill. Id. § 2(b)(5). 
 119. Id. § 2 (b)(1)(A)(ii) & (b)(1)(B). 
 120. Id. § 2(g) (“For purposes of determining whether to take action . . . and for pur-
poses of reviews and investigations . . . shall consider . . . .”) (emphasis added). On the 
decision not to define “national security” for the purposes of CFIUS review, see supra 
notes 87 & 97. 
 121. S. 3549 § 2(g)(1), (g)(2), & (g)(6)(B). Altogether, § 2(g) requires consideration 
of:  
(1) potential effects on United States critical infrastructure, including major en-
ergy assets; (2) potential effects on United States critical technologies; (3) do-
mestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; (4) the 
capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense re-
quirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technol-
ogy, materials, and other supplies and services; (5) the control of domestic in-
dustries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability 
and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national security; 
2007] A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW 1179 
these particular factors and the fact that they are mandatory introduces 
greater structure into the CFIUS inquiry, and creates a priori assumptions 
about what kinds of conduct and activity give rise to a threat to impair 
national security, reflecting a departure from the principle that has gov-
erned CFIUS in the past: ownership itself is a small part of a given vul-
nerability.122 
By incorporating critical infrastructure and technology as mandatory 
criteria, the bill would require CFIUS to review and investigate transac-
tions with unmitigated security risks that occur in any of the twenty-two 
key critical infrastructure industries, implicating transactions in areas as 
diverse as food supply and highways, bridges, and vaccinations.123 The 
same is true for critical technologies, which encompass dual-use tech-
nologies, and thus, technologies used for both private commercial and 
defense contracting purposes are brought squarely within the purview of 
CFIUS review.124 The incorporation of these specific categories of indus-
                                                                                                                                  
(6) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of mili-
tary goods, equipment, or technology to any country (A) identified by the Sec-
retary of State (i) . . . as a country that supports terrorism; (ii) . . . as a country 
of concern regarding missile proliferation; or (iii) . . . as a country of concern 
regarding the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons; (B) identified 
by the Secretary of Defense as posing a potential regional military threat to the 
interests of the United States; or (C) listed . . . on the ‘Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Special Country list’ . . . ; (7) the potential effects of the proposed 
or pending transaction on United States international technological leadership 
in areas affecting United States national security; (8) the long term projection 
of United States requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources 
and materials; and (9) the assessments developed under subsection (c)(7) of the 
country in which the foreign persons acquiring United States entities are based. 
Id. § 2(g). 
 122. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 12 (quoting Douglas Holtz-Eakin and 
Todd Malan). 
 123. The law introduces a requirement that all transactions resulting in foreign control 
of “critical infrastructure” as defined in the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and is intended “to create a realistic standard by which 
CFIUS should measure the potential impact on national security,” while allowing CFIUS 
to promulgate regulations that “exclude from mandatory investigation commercial assets 
that clearly do not by themselves constitute critical infrastructure.” The provisions ex-
clude cases that are resolved through prior mitigation agreements. S. REP. NO. 109-264, 
supra note 109, at 7; see also JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION, CRS RL 32631 
(Oct. 1, 2004) (discussing evolution of the concept of critical infrastructure). 
 124. See generally Nowak, supra note 10 (analyzing the potential application of the 
1992 amendments to Exon-Florio to dual-use technologies for protectionist ends, which 
would result in the diversion of foreign investment from the United States to foreign 
competitors, ultimately weakening the defense industrial base). 
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tries as factors for consideration necessarily entails a shift from a primar-
ily management control-based inquiry focused on issues of defense sup-
ply to a broader inquiry that creates a categorical presumption of risk 
based on foreign ownership of property, including purely physical secu-
rity.125 
Similar consequences follow from the introduction of mandatory con-
sideration of individual country assessments. Under the bill, CFIUS must 
consider individual country assessments when evaluating the risk of the 
proposed transaction not only with respect to a foreign government, but 
also with respect to an investment contemplated by a private citizen of 
that nation.126 Individual country assessments, to be issued following 
enactment of the bill, encompass: (i) a country’s past adherence to non-
proliferation control regimes; (ii) the country’s past relationship with the 
United States, specifically the country’s record on cooperation with the 
United States in counter-terrorism efforts; and (iii) the risk the country 
presents with respect to transshipment and diversion of technologies, 
especially those with military applications and entails analysis of the 
country’s national export control laws and regulations.127 
As with the incorporation of the critical infrastructure and technologies 
requirement, the country assessments dramatically expand the scope of 
the current review. The elements encompassed in the country assessment 
assign greater weight to historical factors in considering the risk of a po-
tential investment than exist in the current paradigm.128 Insofar as the 
country assessment must be applied to private individuals as well as gov-
ernments or persons acting on behalf of governments, the assessment 
creates a categorical presumption of risk with respect to private invest-
                                                                                                                                  
 125. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29 (recom-
mending Congress refrain from incorporating critical infrastructure into the review proc-
ess, and noting that “[t]he administration and Congress should work together to deter-
mine how best to protect critical infrastructure, regardless of who owns a particular com-
pany”). CFIUS’ operative definition of control is provided in the regulations promulgated 
under the existing law, and may or may not be retained if the bill is passed. The current 
operational definition of control resides in 31 C.F.R. § 800.204. 
 126. S. 3549 § 2(g). 
 127. Id. § 2(c)(7). 
 128. In the current law, where a totality of the circumstances review is conducted, the 
past conduct and future plans of the individual investor, and to a lesser extent, the inves-
tors country of origin, are considered but only insofar as they implicate national security 
in light of the risk presented by the overall transaction, and thus, no categorical presump-
tion against certain countries is created. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
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ment from those countries, based purely on the individual investor’s citi-
zenship.129 
As with the existing statute, the proposed bill requires strict confidenti-
ality, but enhances congressional oversight by introducing expansive re-
porting requirements.130 These include notice to Congress upon initiation 
and completion of the first-stage thirty-day review, and if the second-
stage investigation is deemed necessary or required by the statute (as 
with governments party to a transaction) upon initiation and conclusion 
of the forty-five day second-stage investigation.131 Both concluding no-
tices require certification by the Chair and Vice Chair of CFIUS and in-
clude a report as to measures taken, factors considered, and ultimate de-
cisions.132 CFIUS must provide these notices to the Majority and Minor-
ity Leaders of the Senate, the ranking members of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and of any committees in the House 
and Senate with oversight of an agency on CFIUS that is assigned to lead 
review or investigation of the transaction.133 The bill provides the Major-
ity and Minority Leaders discretion to release these reports to other 
members of Congress where the transaction concerned implicates critical 
infrastructure in their home state.134 The proposed bill also retains the 
four-year reporting requirement of the existing bill, but incorporates this 
as a subset of a new annual report.135 Finally, where a proposed transac-
tion concerns critical infrastructure, CFIUS must notify the governor of 
the affected state.136 
                                                                                                                                  
 129. The proposed bill by its terms requires that country assessments be considered for 
all reviews and investigations, whether from a private citizen or government party. S. 
3549 § 2(g). 
 130. Id. § 2 (h)(1). 
 131. Id. § 2 (j)(1) & (2) (providing requirements for notice and reports to Congress 
keyed to the stages of the review process set forth in subsections (a) and (b)). 
 132. Id. § 2(j)(3). 
 133. Id. § 2(j)(3)(C). 
 134. Id. § 2(j)(3)(D). 
 135. The annual report is required to include a discussion of the potential impact on the 
U.S. defense industrial base and critical infrastructure of foreign acquisitions during pre-
ceding year, and an aggregate analysis of the previous four years, prospective discussion 
of risks to national security and critical infrastructure, evaluation of whether there is 
credible evidence of a coordinated strategy by one or more countries or companies to 
acquire critical infrastructure or companies involved in research development or produc-
tion critical technologies, and whether there are industrial espionage activities directed by 
foreign governments against private U.S. companies. Id. § 2(j)(4)(A)–(B); see also S. 
REP. NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 13–15. 
 136. S. 3549 § 2(h)(2). The governor notice requirement stemmed from concerns 
voiced by state-level officials that they had no information regarding a pending transac-
tion that could adversely affect their state, especially with respect to critical infrastruc-
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The bill further disciplines the process by implementing safeguards for 
transactions that are notified to CFIUS. Withdrawal and resubmission of 
a filing triggers a mandatory forty-five day investigation.137 The bill also 
requires CFIUS to monitor withdrawn transactions that nonetheless pro-
ceed and to initiate review if parties do not voluntarily re-file.138 Where 
CFIUS resolves national security risks through mitigation agreements,139 
the bill provides for ongoing oversight of such agreements by CFIUS, 140 
underwritten by a grant of authority to the Attorney General to investi-
gate and enforce the agreements in the District of Columbia.141 
The minimum threshold analysis introduced by the new bill shifts the 
existing balance by subordinating the open investment principle to na-
tional security concerns. This shift is reflected in the presumptions the 
bill creates regarding two categories of risks: those presented by owner-
ship of infrastructures and technology deemed “critical” and those pre-
sented by the national origin of the proposed individual or country in-
vestment.142 
The benefit of this shift is that in clearly articulating sources of risks, 
including long-term risks, the review process is more likely to ensure that 
questionable transactions are investigated by CFIUS, reducing the likeli-
hood that risky transactions will “slip through the cracks.” As noted 
above, the definition of critical infrastructure is broad and encompasses 
economic security criteria.143 Consequently, the mandatory consideration 
                                                                                                                                  
ture, with view to discussing potential security concerns, subject to the same confidential-
ity requirements that apply to the federal government. S. REP. NO. 109-264, supra note 
109, at 12. 
 137. S. 3549 § 2(b)(3). 
 138. Id. § 2(b)(4). 
 139. Though such mitigation agreements resolve most investigations in approval, the 
current review process does not address enforcement subsequent to approval. See S. REP. 
NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 13. 
 140. S. 3549 § 2(i)(4). 
 141. Remedies include injunctive relief, damages, and divestiture. Id. § 2(i)(5). 
 142. The existing statutory framework was criticized in 2002 on similar grounds be-
cause the broad discretion conferred by the statute could be interpreted as broadly as the 
proposed bill. See generally Christopher R. Fenton, Note, U.S. Policy Toward Foreign 
Direct Investment Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 195 (2002) (noting that the existing statutory framework in 
the new post-September 11 security context could be expanded to include consideration 
of threats identified on the basis of individual and organizational relationships, rather 
than investor nationality, as necessary to adequately address threats posed by non-state 
actors, and thus will expand scope of review to encompass foreign control of domestic 
industries, particularly those required for the anti-terror campaign). 
 143. “The term ‘critical infrastructure’ . . . includ[es] national economic security and 
national public health or safety . . . .” S. 3549 § 2(m)(2). 
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of critical infrastructure ensures that FDI that may entail long-term con-
sequences for the United States through control of American assets, 
whereby foreign owners may exert their influence in a fashion inimical 
to American interests, for example by effectuating technology transfer or 
transferring American jobs overseas, is thoroughly investigated.144 
In addition, requiring CFIUS to consider country assessments as part of 
its review ensures that each transaction is placed in a broader geo-
political context. With respect to the DPW deal, for example, the security 
risks presented by the UAE’s acquisition of a controlling interest would 
be considered in light of factors like its proximity to Iran, the evidence 
that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan exploited Dubai’s relaxed 
environment to smuggle nuclear components to Iran, Libya and North 
Korea, and its role as a conduit for funding of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.145 Furthermore, the inclusion of this factor in the review 
process creates an incentive for private parties to encourage states, and 
for states themselves, to establish a good track record of compliance with 
U.S. foreign policy. 
Similarly, the expanded reporting requirements promise to introduce 
greater discipline in the process by ensuring Congress is informed about 
deals at initiation and conclusion, making oversight more effective.146 A 
corollary benefit would be increased public and congressional confidence 
that reviews are handled as required by law, minimizing the public con-
troversy that follows when a transaction is criticized in popular press. 
This, in turn, could prevent the public controversy that resulted in alien-
ation of the investors in both the DPW and Smartmatic deals, and ulti-
mately, divestment of their U.S. holdings.147 
By the same token, this approach may be criticized as over-inclusive. 
The incorporation of mandatory consideration of transactions affecting 
critical infrastructure148 includes a diverse array of industry sectors.149 As 
                                                                                                                                  
 144. See, e.g., GAO Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 11, 25. 
 145. See S. REP. NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 10–11. 
 146. Id. at 13. 
 147. See BBC NEWS, Q&A, supra note 60; NY TIMES, Voting Machine Maker for Sale, 
supra note 75. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 5195(c) (“[S]ystems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital 
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health 
or safety, or any combination of those matters.”). 
 149. The National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies the critical infrastructure 
sectors as agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, de-
fense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, bank-
ing and finance, chemical industry, postal, and shipping. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra 
note 5, at 29–30. As the linchpin for all homeland defense legislation, see id. at 47–50. 
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discussed above, this creates a categorical presumption that investment in 
certain industries and physical assets presents a national security risk and 
introduces overt economic security factors that have been rejected in the 
past, in part because requiring consideration of transactions that were not 
at the core of national security would limit executive discretion to re-
spond to national security considerations while also deterring foreign 
investment.150 Worse, given the small membership of CFIUS, it risks 
defusing its focus and diverting limited resources from transactions 
CFIUS would otherwise prioritize.151 This is especially true in light of 
the fact that critical infrastructure encompasses at least twenty-five per-
cent of the economy.152 Moreover, the incorporation of country assess-
ments risks alienating foreign governments because they may be de-
ployed as an overarching policy tool, whereby foreign investment is con-
ditioned upon establishing a record of cooperation with U.S. policy 
goals.153 Because “past CFIUS cases indicate it is inherently more diffi-
cult for a CFIUS agency to argue that foreign firms from allied countries 
                                                                                                                                  
See generally MOTEFF & PARFOMAK, supra note 123 (helpful overview of evolution of 
the definition of critical infrastructure). 
 150. See Holmer et al., supra note 105, 608, 615–17 (listing series of bills introduced 
in the early 1990s that attempted to introduce economic security criteria but failed); 
LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 28; Deborah M. Mo-
staghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat To National Security or a 
Tempest In a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 591–3, 622 (2007). 
 151. Byrne, supra note 108, at 905 (noting that inclusion of economic security in 
CFIUS review would dilute the focus from “true threats” and allow its diversion to gen-
eral economic protectionism with the added risk that foreign nations would emulate this 
policy, jeopardizing U.S. foreign investments abroad). 
 152. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29. 
 153. See Wysocki, Jr. et al., supra note 14. Unlike the Senate bill, the U.S. Model Bi-
lateral Investment Treaty rejects nationality as a proxy for any purpose. Article 9(1) states 
“[n]either Party may require that an enterprise of that Party that is a covered investment 
appoint to senior management positions natural persons of any particular nationality.” 
Article 9(2) allows a party to require a majority of a managing board of directors “be of a 
particular nationality or resident in a particular territory, provided that the requirement 
does not materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over its invest-
ment.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf. One scholar has suggested that 
the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties, despite the failure of the international 
community in the aggregate to attain consensus on general principles governing foreign 
investment, is evidence of legal obligations undertaken by states has resulted in “some-
thing like customary law.” Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and Interna-
tional Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 150 (2003). 
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may threaten national security” this is particularly problematic as a crite-
ria for FDI risk assessment.154 
In expanding CFIUS’ scope through inclusion of critical infrastructure 
and country assessments as factors, the bill broadens the sweep of CFIUS 
review and investigation, effectively expanding its operational definition 
of “national security” but without articulating any clear guidance to in-
vestors.155 In this way, the bill unnecessarily risks alienating foreign in-
vestors and governments because differing views of national security are 
already accounted for in CFIUS membership.156 By decreasing CFIUS’ 
discretion and increasing the number of factors for consideration, the bill 
implicates an underlying concern that the operational definition of na-
tional security currently employed by CFIUS is too narrow.157 Broadly 
defined, “national security” may encompass concerns about the growth 
and direction of the U.S. economy at large, consequences for the U.S. 
economy where foreign capital may be from a country vulnerable to so-
cial or political crises and general commercial competitiveness from 
risks presented by technology transfer.158 Since different views of na-
tional security are currently taken into account in the diverse CFIUS 
membership,159 where such views are materially different, their consid-
                                                                                                                                  
 154. GAO Feb. 1991, supra note 95, at 8. This trend is also reflected in the larger pat-
tern of foreign investment discussed above, which noted that the predominant source of 
FDI in the United States is countries typically allied with the United States. Alienating 
investments from countries that are less clearly allied runs counter to the principle of 
open investment whereby aligning economic interests contributes to overall stability, and 
consequently to the maintenance of national security. See discussion supra Part II. 
 155. An article discussing the 1991 regulations promulgated by the Treasury Depart-
ment noted that the regulations failed to define national security with any specificity, 
despite complaints from investors and multi-national corporations that had lobbied for a 
bright line test because the regulations provided inadequate guidance. See Holmer et al., 
supra note 105, at 595, 608–10. 
 156. The debate regarding the definition of “national security” in Exon-Florio has 
plagued the review process since its inception. See id. In 1990, a GAO report concluded 
that “the absence of a specific definition of national security” had not negatively im-
pacted CFIUS investigations. GAO Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 11. In 2003, CFIUS was 
expanded to include the DHS, which conducts reviews of critical infrastructure to iden-
tify and handle threats. See Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 F.R. 10,619 (Feb. 28, 2003). 
 157. At present, the term “national security” is undefined. In practice, the scope of the 
review process provides an operational definition. A narrow definition concerns primarily 
firms whose business derives from defense contracts. A broader definition encompasses 
firms engaged in non-defense commercial business. See GAO Mar. 1990, supra note 28, 
at 11. 
 158. See, e.g., GAO May 1990, supra note 11, at 3. 
 159. By requiring CFIUS to examine security risks in terms of aggregate effects over 
long-term, and thus limiting foreign investment could “translate into inferiority in the 
development, prototyping, manufacturing and production and product improvement 
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eration is ensured by the CFIUS practice of proceeding by consensus.160 
This means the dissenting vote of any one member automatically triggers 
the second-stage review, whereupon the dissenting vote must be brought 
to the attention of the President as part of the final determination whether 
to exercise his or her authority to block a deal.161 
In addition to expanding the operative definition of national security, 
the bill also expands reporting requirements, but fails to provide clear 
guidelines for confidentiality and disclosure on the part of Congress, 
risking politicization of a review process that had previously been safely 
sequestered from Congress.162 This in turn, combined with the require-
ment to notify and consult with state governors regarding investment in 
their state’s critical infrastructure,163 which by definition includes eco-
nomic security criteria, introduces a strong likelihood that the review 
process will be exploited for protectionist ends.164 
Finally, the combination of increased oversight and stricter enforce-
ment of national security mitigation agreements could entail inappropri-
ate involvement in the business decisions of companies.165 Especially in 
conjunction with other aspects of the bill, the provisions governing miti-
gation agreements introduce a risk of protectionism, whereby CFIUS 
could become a vehicle for the imposition of performance requirements 
on foreign acquisitions by U.S. companies.166 Because these mitigation 
agreements have the full force of law and are subject to investigation and 
enforcement, the bill may be a further deterrent to foreign investors faced 
with internalizing the cost of broad U.S. policy concerns regarding na-
tional security.167 
                                                                                                                                  
strategies . . . .” Bobrow & Kudrle, supra note 11, at 74–5; see also Nowak, supra note 
10. 
 160. Byrne, supra note 108, at 909. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 15–17. 
 163. S. 3549 § 2(h)(2). 
 164. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29. The exist-
ing review process has itself been criticized as a vehicle for domestic protectionism. See 
generally Shearer, supra note 42. The litigation brought by the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey and the Miami-based stevedoring company cited contractual claims 
and concerns over security in their suits to block the deal. Concerns regarding layoffs, 
etc. may have been an underlying motivation for the suit. See, e.g., WALL ST. J. ONLINE, 
Ports Deal News Tracker, supra note 53. 
 165. GAO Sept. 2002, supra note 102, at 24, 27. 
 166. Id. at 28. 
 167. A corporation’s primary duty is to its shareholders; placing the burden of mitigat-
ing security issues with respect to critical infrastructure that encompasses bridges and flu 
vaccinations places too much burden on private capital. See J. Michael Littlejohn, Using 
all the Kings Horses for Homeland Security: Implementing the Defense Production Act 
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C. Does the Senate Bill Enhance National Security? 
On balance, the new bill shifts the existing paradigm, at minimum, by 
bringing the national security principle on par with, if not elevating it 
over, the open investment principle. In contrast, in the existing paradigm, 
the national security principle is often subordinate to the open investment 
principle, while allowing discretion as needed. This paradigm shift finds 
symbolic and substantive manifestation in the appointment of the Secre-
tary of Defense as the Vice-Chair for CFIUS.168 Because the bill risks 
that American businesses may have greater difficulty courting foreign 
investors, with the consequence that over time, flows of FDI could be 
reduced, the question becomes whether the Senate bill accomplishes this 
result with appreciable benefits for national security. The application of 
the two different paradigms to the DWP and Smartmatic deals helps il-
lustrate the different schema in action. 
With respect to the DPW transaction, the principle concerns were that 
CFIUS failed to subject the transaction to the second-stage forty-five day 
review required by existing law, and that even if it had, CFIUS failed to 
properly consider the larger geo-political context of the deal, especially 
as related to national security risks to ports within the United States.169 
Under the new paradigm, the corporate entity owned by the UAE would 
be required to notify CFIUS of the deal, and under the expanded report-
ing requirements, Congress would also be notified, allowing it to ensure 
that the second-stage forty-five day investigation was conducted as re-
quired by both the new bill and existing law.170 However, the mitigation 
agreement negotiations that occurred during the first-stage review of the 
DPW acquisition would probably not have been materially different, al-
though the negotiations may have been accomplished without the furor 
that surrounded the transaction and perhaps avoiding the related public 
pressure that eventually scuttled the U.S. portions of the deal.171 
                                                                                                                                  
for Disaster Relief and Critical Infrastructure Protection, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) 
(observing the important role of the private sector, the negative publicity where risks to 
infrastructure are identified, how this may operate as a disincentive to effective collabora-
tion with the private sector, and identifying the legal framework for government authority 
to compel cooperation from the private sector in the event of natural disaster or terrorist 
attack). 
 168. S. 3549 § 2(c)(3); Byrne, supra note 108, 909 (arguing that maintaining the De-
partment of Treasury as chair ensures primacy of open investment policy while allowing 
agencies with different mandates adequate authority to ensure that national security con-
cerns are addressed; changing the chairmanship risks upsetting this balance without real 
national security benefit). 
 169. See Hufbauer, supra note 52; Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3. 
 170. S. 3549 § 2(j)(1)–(2). 
 171. BBC NEWS, supra note 60. 
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It is unclear how CFIUS’ consideration of the mandatory country as-
sessments in evaluating the risks presented by the transaction would af-
fect the review; it is possible that the UAE’s track record as a conduit for 
arms and money to terrorists and rogue states would force CFIUS to rec-
ommend blocking the deal at the conclusion of the second-stage investi-
gation.172 Because it is unlikely that the national security mitigation 
agreements would have been materially different, it is not clear that any 
appreciable security benefit would be attained by the more disciplined 
minimum threshold paradigm reflected in the bill. At minimum, the issue 
would be brought to the President, including any dissenting views, and 
on the facts of this case, the deal would probably have been allowed to 
proceed.173 In this case, as the President noted defending his approval of 
the transaction,174 the factual misconception that was the kernel of the 
controversy is two-fold: the nature of the property interest in the ports 
(here merely leases), and the security responsibilities entailed by that 
interest.175 For example, it is common place in the United States for for-
eign corporations to own and operate U.S. ports.176 Port security remains 
a primary responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection supervises security for cargo, and U.S. citizens 
staff most ports.177 Consequently, risks relating to ports as a conduit for 
foreign personnel and cargo, including terrorists or bombs, remain under 
the purview of the U.S. government irrespective of who manages vessels 
and ports.178 Thus, the security risks specifically implicated by the trans-
action were likely mitigated by the agreement, and those that were not 
were well beyond the power of DPW to mitigate.179 The principle con-
cerns raised by critics were symptomatic of larger concerns regarding 
U.S. vulnerability in ports at large and not specific to DPW. Regardless 
                                                                                                                                  
 172. S. 3549 § 2 (c)(7) (mandatory country assessments). 
 173. 31 C.F.R. § 800.504 (regulation requiring presentation of dissenting views to 
President). 
 174. Major Garrett et al., Bush Says He Will Veto Any Bill to Stop UAE Port Deal, FOX 
NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,185479,00.html (describing 
Bush Administration’s defense of President’s approval of the DPW transaction). 
 175. JOHN FRITTELLI, TERMINAL OPERATORS AND THEIR ROLE IN U.S. PORT AND 
MARITIME SECURITY, CRS RL33383 (Apr. 20, 2006) (providing a comprehensive over-
view of the operation and security of U.S. ports). 
 176. State-owned Singaporean shipping company, Neptune Orient Lines, operates U.S. 
ports. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3. 
 177. See generally FRITTELLI, supra note 175; see also Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra 
note 3. 
 178. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3. 
 179. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 56, 59 and accompanying text (itemizing conces-
sions, including, of specific relevance here, the provision of personnel files to DHS). 
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of the outcome of this particular transaction, the security vulnerability of 
U.S. ports remains.180 
The consequences for the Smartmatic deal are slightly different. The 
Smartmatic deal concerned the acquisition of a relatively small, privately 
held concern, Sequoia Voting Systems, based in Oakland, California, 
which, as discussed, never underwent CFIUS review.181 The principle 
concern with the Smartmatic deal was that the transaction implicated the 
government of Venezuela and that electronic voting systems are too cen-
tral to U.S. national interests and too vulnerable to tampering.182 Whether 
the new minimum threshold paradigm proposed by the Senate would be 
more likely to bring the Smartmatic deal under review by CFIUS de-
pends on a few different factors. If the Venezuelan government had an 
interest in the transaction, either itself or a person acting on its behalf, the 
parties to the deal would be required to file with CFIUS (under both 
paradigms).183 However, because the deal involved neither the govern-
ment of Venezuela, nor a person acting on behalf of Venezuela, it is not 
clear that this acquisition would have been brought to the attention of 
CFIUS.184 Two principle possibilities remain. Given the expansive defi-
nition of critical infrastructure, whether the transaction would be submit-
ted for review under the new paradigm depends on whether voting sys-
tems would be considered critical infrastructure.185 The second possibil-
ity under the new paradigm is if the Secretary of Defense determined 
Venezuela constituted a regional threat.186 If the deal were notified to 
CFIUS through either mechanism, under the new paradigm, Congress 
would have been alerted to the occurrence of the transaction. 
In contrast, under the existing paradigm, CFIUS would neither be re-
quired to nor precluded from consideration of this transaction. In addi-
tion, under the existing law, if the transaction were notified to CFIUS, 
both the Department of Defense or the DHS (both currently represented 
on CFIUS) could review the transaction and conclude that foreign own-
ership of a voting systems manufacturer constituted a potential impair-
ment of national security. In this case, any security concerns could be 
addressed through mitigation agreements, without the need to subject the 
                                                                                                                                  
 180. As reflected in the enactment of broad port security legislation following the 
DPW controversy. See discussion infra notes 208–209 and accompanying text. 
 181. See discussion, supra Part III.B. 
 182. See SVS Oct. 29, 2006 Press Release, supra note 73; GAO Elections, 2007, supra 
note 78. 
 183. S. 3549 § 2(b)(5) (mandatory notice requirements for foreign governments); see 
supra note 93. 
 184. See Golden, supra note 1. 
 185. S. 3549 § 2(g)(1). 
 186. Id. § 2(g)(6)(B). 
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transaction to the enhanced scrutiny required by the additional factors in 
the Senate bill. Under both the existing law and the proposed law, the 
larger policy concern regarding the vulnerability of electronic voting sys-
tems, like the larger problem with ports following the scuttled DPW deal, 
remains. 
Thus, the new paradigm may have some impact in increasing the num-
ber of investigations notified to CFIUS for review, but without apprecia-
bly enhancing national security, and potentially at significant long-term 
cost. 
V. RESOLVING THE EXON-FLORIO PROBLEM 
As illustrated above, the existing paradigm strikes a preferable balance 
between open investment and national security, and preserves the sub-
stance of the principle underlying open investment, which maintains that 
aligning economic interests in the long term provides greater stability, 
and ultimately, security.187 Despite its preferable balance of open in-
vestment and national security values, the analysis above reveals several 
critical and interrelated problems in the current review and investigation 
process: 1) CFIUS does not necessarily follow the review process man-
dated by law;188 2) CFIUS failure to keep Congress abreast of its review 
process may create a volatile mix of congressional and public lack of 
confidence that results in divestment despite lack of any credible evi-
dence of a threat to national security;189 and 3) CFIUS failure to inform 
Congress may also result in an inappropriate focus on security risks cre-
ated by a specific transaction, diverting focus from the larger security 
issue of which the transaction is but a part.190 
While the proposed bill seeks to address these concerns, it does so at 
great cost by creating categorical presumptions as to who and what pre-
sent national security concerns at risk of alienating foreign investments 
and governments, which could redound to the detriment of the American 
economy in the long run.191 Deterring investment in U.S. companies 
means capital will flow elsewhere and alienates private and government 
parties with whom the United States would gain the most by cooperat-
                                                                                                                                  
 187. See Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 11. 
 188. See Mostaghel, supra note 150, at 620 (CFIUS failed to conduct the forty-five day 
investigation of the DPW transaction as required by the existing law). 
 189. See id. at 622 (describing the partisan melee on Capital Hill over the DPW deal). 
 190. See Byrne, supra note 108, at 902–05. 
 191. “There are those who would broaden Exon-Florio to include threats to national 
objectives such as industrial competitiveness, but that sort of inclusiveness would basi-
cally cover exactly those nations with whom technological cooperation has the most to 
offer for U.S. objectives.” Bobrow & Kudrle, supra note 11, at 90. 
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ing.192 On the other hand, failing to address the problems implicated by 
lack of congressional and public confidence in the CFIUS review process 
may implicate similar long-term costs by subjecting specific transactions 
to unwarranted and partisan scrutiny.193  
Alienation of private sector and government foreign interests presents 
very real costs.194 For example, concessions regarding access to em-
ployment records in the final stages of the DPW deal represents a missed 
opportunity to obtain inside information about global shipping, and as a 
result, for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to gain insight into 
global smuggling of terrorists and weapons.195 Furthermore, encouraging 
the deal would have helped ensure DPW instituted practices compliant 
with U.S. security standards in U.S. ports as well as abroad, notably the 
port in Dubai.196 Similarly, enlisting the cooperation of Smartmatic in 
developing electronic voting systems standards and in ensuring that 
Smartmatic units meet these standard would likely result in the diffusion 
of these standards to elections in Venezuela, if for no other reason than 
economies of scale.197 
                                                                                                                                  
 192. Nowak, supra note 10, at 1030–31. 
 193. In the controversy following the DPW deal, it was observed that congressional 
case-by-case review of commercial transactions at large would generate untenable uncer-
tainties and potential delays for foreign investors with a chilling effect, but this is equally 
true whether the scrutiny is de jure or de facto. See C. Fred Bergsten, Op-Ed., Avoiding 
Another Dubai, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2006, available at http://www.iie.com/ 
publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=603; see also Bush Threatens Veto in Ports 
Row, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006, http://news.bb.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/ 
4737940.stm. 
 194. The private sector and foreign governments are identified as critical partners in 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 
33–35. 
 195. Block, supra note 56. 
 196. DPW, with the $6.8 billion purchase of P&O, became the third largest port opera-
tor in the world. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3; see also LARSON & MARCHICK, 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 20; King, Jr., supra note 59. The significance of 
DPW’s willingness to assume responsibility for purchasing, deploying and maintaining 
radiation detection systems cannot be underestimated. At this stage, although there are 
serious questions as to the efficacy and value of next-generation systems, DHS figures 
estimate an increase of over $320,000 per unit to up-grade existing security, a process 
that would not be complete at all U.S. ports until 2013. A recent report indicated these 
costs could be well below actual cost. GAO, COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: DHS’S 
DECISION TO PROCURE AND DEPLOY THE NEXT GENERATION OF RADIATION DETECTION 
EQUIPMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, GAO-07-581T, Mar. 14, 
2007 (Testimony of Gene Aloise). 
 197. For example, the results of the widely criticized 2004 election in Venezuela were 
eventually audited. The Carter Center participated in the audit and attested that the 
Smartmatic voting machines operated “flawlessly.” Juan Forero, Opposition Rejects Au-
1192 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
Alienating the government of UAE would have further concrete costs. 
The Dubai government runs the Middle East’s biggest airline, Emirates 
Air, just one of a several UAE government-owned companies with sub-
stantial investments worldwide, including in the United States.198 Despite 
its mixed record supporting U.S. foreign policy, the UAE gave $100 mil-
lion to assist victims of Hurricane Katrina.199 In addition, in a “symbol 
that the United States trusted the UAE and took the UAE seriously,” the 
UAE government was permitted to purchase 80 F-16 fighter jets in a 
$6.4 billion deal in 2000.200 Following criticism that funds funneled 
through its hub financed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
UAE bolstered its anti-money laundering and terror-financing laws and 
generally increased oversight.201 The UAE was also the first country to 
implement the U.S. Cargo Security initiative to pre-screen containers at 
foreign ports and hosts five U.S. Customs Officials.202 Finally, the Jebel 
Ali Port is an important global host to the U.S. Navy, more so than any 
other foreign port.203 The DPW acquisition was part of the UAE’s overall 
plan to develop a stable, international financial center based in Dubai, 
transforming oil wealth into longer term investments, diversifying the 
economy and increasing the region’s integration into the global econ-
omy.204 
Instead of burdening the influx of much-needed foreign capital with 
broad-based U.S. security concerns, the central problems of the Smart-
matic and DPW deals should be addressed. Namely, reform should seek 
to increase congressional confidence that a thorough review has been 
conducted,205 while providing a mechanism to identify and address larger 
security vulnerabilities that may be exposed in the CFIUS review proc-
ess. As the GAO noted, “[t]hese questions need to be addressed at a 
higher policy-making level and in a broader context than the case-by-
                                                                                                                                  
dit Plan in Venezuela Recall Vote Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A5. On the 
emerging controversy, see Juan Forero & John Schwartz, Venezuelan Recall Is In Dispute 
Even Before the Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A3; Brian Ellsworth, A Crucial Vote 
for Venezuela and a Company, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at W1. 
 198. Spindle et al., supra note 3 (these companies purchased major historic hotels and 
landmarks in New York, San Francisco, and London). 
 199. Joel Brinkley and Craig S. Smith, Storm and Crisis: Foreign Aid; Offers Pour In, 
But the U.S. Is Unprepared, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A25. 
 200. Spindle et al., supra note 3. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Spindle & El-Rashidi, supra note 27. 
 205. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 25–26. 
2007] A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW 1193 
case approach presently afforded by CFIUS.”206 What is striking about 
the DPW and Smartmatic controversies is that while both represented 
lost opportunities for the United States to collaborate with the private 
sector to implement national security policy on a global scale,207 one 
positive parallel development was the drafting of legislation to address 
the larger security concerns implicated in the transactions. In 2006, Con-
gress enacted laws to address the unique security concerns raised in 
ports.208 In the following year, bills were introduced to Congress to se-
cure electronic voting systems, but as of the time of publication, none has 
yet passed.209 The costs of these security concerns should not be assessed 
on each individual transaction, but by legislation to address the larger 
vulnerability that may emerge from the inquiry. The value of congres-
sional oversight in this context is not only to ensure that CFIUS appro-
priately implements presidential authority to review transactions,210 but 
more importantly to provide oversight on the second prong of the Exon-
Florio test: where existing laws provide the President insufficient author-
ity to protect national security.211 As illustrated by the Smartmatic and 
DPW deals, the goal of congressional oversight should be to focus atten-
tion on specific security vulnerabilities that may not be adequately ad-
dressed through mitigation agreements in recognition of the fact that the 
identifiable risks that emerge from a particular transaction are in many 
cases only a small part of a given vulnerability. 
To the extent that greater congressional oversight is required or desir-
able, it should be strictly circumscribed to avoid the partisan melee that 
ultimately alienated the investors in the DPW and Smartmatic deals. As 
one author notes, although “Congress has a role in forming U.S. foreign 
and national security policy, . . . its role is more appropriately a secon-
dary one of oversight and review.”212 While the proposed bill purports to 
                                                                                                                                  
 206. GAO Feb. 1991, supra note 95, at 10. 
 207. See Stephen Flynn & Daniel B. Prieto, Op-Ed., Capitalizing on the Private Sector 
to Protect the Homeland, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2006. 
 208. Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347 
(codified in scattered sections of 9 U.S.C and 46 U.S.C.). 
 209. Vote Integrity and Verification Act of 2007, S. 559, 110th Cong. (2007); Voter 
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, H.R. 811, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 210. Cf. Mostaghel, supra note 150, at 620–22 (rejecting any change to the existing 
law and suggesting CFIUS do a better job following it). 
 211. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e). 
 212. Russell J. Bruemmer, Intelligence Community Reorganization: Declining the 
Invitation to Struggle, 101 YALE L.J. 867, 880 (1992). As Bruemmer notes, where na-
tional security and foreign relations are concerned, the executive powers are at their con-
stitutional apex. In fact, the executive branch will have the best and most accurate infor-
mation both about the geo-political context of a particular transaction and the degree to 
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maintain confidentiality, its notice and reporting mechanisms are sure to 
embroil transactions in partisan domestic politics, introducing a substan-
tial risk to the transactions concerned.213 Furthermore, the bill provides 
no specific measures for ensuring confidentiality, while injecting sensi-
tive national security information and proprietary corporate information 
into the partisan and political arena of Congress.214 
At most, the annual reports proposed in the new bill should permit suf-
ficient oversight to ensure that Congress is confident CFIUS conducts a 
thorough review and to alert Congress to the larger security issues that 
emerge out of a particular transaction; any expanded notice and reporting 
requirements should be rejected.215 In the event that further scrutiny 
demonstrates a need for enhanced oversight, a committee modeled after 
the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence provide may a viable solu-
tion.216 
The Select Committee emerged relatively recently, in 1976, at around 
the same time a committee to review FDI was first considered.217 The 
interests at stake are similar; the oversight responsibilities implicate na-
tional security and core executive branch activity, with a strong need for 
confidentiality. To implement its oversight responsibilities, the Senate 
created an oversight committee with limited membership, strict voting 
procedures and rules governing confidentiality of information, and im-
posed consequences for failure to comply. More specifically, member-
ship in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is cooperative 
through appointment by the President based on recommendations of the 
Senate leadership; membership must represent members from both po-
litical parties.218 Any disclosure of confidential information by the Com-
mittee requires first, that the Committee vote, and if a majority agrees 
that disclosure is in the public interest, the Committee must notify the 
President, who may object that the threat to the national interest posed by 
such disclosure outweighs the public interest in that confidential infor-
mation, whereupon the Committee may vote to refer to the question of 
                                                                                                                                  
which it presents a threat to national security; the President is also the party on whom 
failure will be most prominently visited. Id. at 878–80 (analyzing the roles of the execu-
tive and legislative branches with respect to intelligence community reform). 
 213. The mandatory notification to state governors, S. 3549 § 2(h)(2), and case-by-case 
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 215. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29. 
 216. On reporting requirements introduced in the new bill, see id. § 2(j). 
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Intelligence); see also Breummer, supra note 212, at 873–4. 
 218. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. app. A, § 2(a)(1) & (a)(2) (1976). 
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disclosure of such information to the Senate at large in closed session.219 
Aside from this procedure for disclosure, all other information is confi-
dential, and any individual that discloses information in violation of 
these procedures may be subject to censure, including removal from of-
fice.220 In so doing, the regulations address the need for oversight while 
remaining cognizant of the importance of confidentiality and the vulner-
ability of congressional oversight to inappropriate politicization.  As ap-
plied to CFIUS, a similar model would provide specific measures to en-
sure that congressional oversight is employed only to ensure the law is 
followed and where executive review reveals inadequacy in presidential 
authority to address national security exigencies. Limiting the purview of 
oversight in this way, combined with the introduction of strict procedural 
requirements to ensure that any such committee is bipartisan and the en-
forcement of confidentiality with concrete penalties limits the risk of 
politicization of particular transactions and the disclosure of confidential 
information (whether related to national security or to the interests of the 
parties to the transaction), while achieving the objective of oversight: 
that Congress receives timely notice of larger security risks where the 
President’s authority is inadequate. This, in turn, would ensure the pri-
macy of traditional principles of U.S. open investment policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The DPW deal precipitated a controversy that resulted in renewed 
scrutiny of the role of FDI in the United States. The legislative reform of 
the CFIUS review process proposed in the wake of this controversy 
represents a dramatic shift in traditionally open U.S. investment policy. 
In particular, the minimum threshold paradigm for FDI review intro-
duced by the new bill limits CFIUS discretion with respect to the inter-
pretation of who and what represent national security risks, without tan-
gible security benefit. At the same time, the new bill sends a hostile mes-
sage, a shot across the bow, to foreign investors. The DPW and Smart-
matic transactions and their subsequent divestiture represent a paradig-
matic failure to advance U.S. strategic interests on a global scale through 
partnership with corporations operating worldwide. Furthermore, the 
proposed bill risks that individual transactions will be burdened with 
broader national security concerns. To maintain the primacy of U.S. open 
investment policy, it may be necessary to expand congressional oversight 
to restore congressional and public confidence in the post-September 11 
era of heightened security concern. To the extent such oversight is neces-
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1196 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
sary, it should be strictly circumscribed. In this context, oversight is re-
quired to ensure that CFIUS applies the existing law appropriately and to 
ensure Congress may respond with legislation specific to any larger secu-
rity vulnerability revealed in the review process. Furthermore, any ex-
pansion of congressional review should include confidentiality require-
ments enforced by strict procedures and penalties that resemble the pro-
cedures of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
VII. EPILOGUE 
As this Note was prepared for publication, the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 2007 was signed into law by President Bush.221 
While a complete review of the new law is beyond the scope of the Note 
at this late date, some preliminary observations are in order. 
The new law reflects many of the characteristics of the minimum 
threshold paradigm proposed in the bill analyzed in this Note. In particu-
lar, the new law changes CFIUS membership, expands CFIUS’ scope of 
review while reducing its discretion, and substantially increases congres-
sional oversight. 
Under the new law, the most notable new CFIUS members are the Sec-
retary of Labor and the Director of National Intelligence.222 In addition, 
unlike the bill analyzed above, which threatened to subordinate the open 
investment principle to that of national security by designating the Secre-
tary of Defense as Vice Chairperson of CFIUS,223 the new law retains the 
Secretary of the Treasury as the sole chairperson of CFIUS.224 The addi-
tion of the Secretary of Labor remains troubling, however, in that it may 
signal a shift from a narrow national security focus to one that may also 
entail broader national security concerns like the preservation of domes-
tic jobs.225 
As in the minimum threshold paradigm analyzed above, the new law 
creates a presumption that foreign control of critical infrastructure cre-
ates a national security risk.226 In the new law, when an investment by a 
foreign entity could result in control of critical infrastructure and any 
security risks remain unmitigated, a second-stage, forty-five day investi-
                                                                                                                                  
 221. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, PL 110-49 (HR 556), 121 
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gation is required.227 In addition, critical infrastructure is incorporated 
into the law’s definition of national security and into the list of factors 
for consideration by CFIUS, expanding the scope of CFIUS review at 
least as much as the minimum threshold paradigm.228 In marked contrast 
to the minimum threshold paradigm, however, the potentially unlimited 
sweep of this expansion is ameliorated by the requirement that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury shall publish “guidance on the types of transactions 
that the Committee has reviewed and that have presented national secu-
rity considerations . . . .”229 
The new law also expands the scope of CFIUS review to include 
evaluation of the country of origin’s track record of compliance with 
non-proliferation regimes and its “relationship” with the United States.230 
These factors are the same factors that the bill analyzed in the body of 
this Note characterized as “Assessments of Foreign Countries.”231 The 
new law limits consideration of these additional factors for review to 
those investments by or on behalf of a foreign government.232 Thus, on 
its face and in contrast to the minimum threshold paradigm discussed 
above, this expansion of CFIUS’ scope of review does not by its terms 
require CFIUS to consider this evidence when evaluating the security 
risk posed by a non-government affiliated private foreign investor.233 On 
the other hand, the new law requires any mitigation agreement be “based 
on a risk-based analysis, conducted by the Committee, of the threat to 
national security of the covered transaction.”234 “Risk-based analysis” is 
not a defined term; however, the new law’s definition of national security 
incorporates “issues relating to ‘homeland security.’”235 The combination 
of these elements in the new law, like in the minimum threshold para-
digm analyzed in the body of this Note, present a risk that individual 
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 228. “The term ‘national security’ shall be construed so as to include those issues relat-
ing to ‘homeland security’, including its application to critical infrastructure.” Id. § 
2(a)(5). Critical infrastructure is also incorporated into the factors for CFIUS considera-
tion. Id. § 4 (f)(4). The inclusion of a definition of “national security” for the purposes of 
CFIUS review is itself a significant change. See supra note 120. 
 229. 121 Stat. 246 § 2 (b)(2)(E). 
 230. Id. § 4(4). 
 231. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 232. In the chapeau to the subsection, 121 Stat. 246 § 4(4), the new law states “as ap-
propriate, and particularly with respect to transactions requiring an investigation under 
subsection (b)(1)(B),” i.e. those instances where CFIUS “determines that the covered 
transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction . . . .” Id. § 2(b)(1)(B). 
 233. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 234. 121 Stat. 246 § 5(l)(1)(B). 
 235. Id. § 2(a)(5) 
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transactions, whether they involve government or private foreign inves-
tors, may be required to internalize the costs of broad homeland security 
issues in order to secure CFIUS approval.236 
The lack of tracking for drop-outs from the review process and lack of 
enforcement authority for mitigation agreements noted as problems in 
the law prior to amendment237 have also been addressed in the new 
law.238 While these were addressed in the unadopted bill analyzed above, 
the new law strikes a better balance by allowing CFIUS to promulgate its 
own methods for evaluating compliance and by ensuring that compliance 
with any mitigation agreements will not place “unnecessary burdens on a 
party to a covered transaction.”239 
Finally, like the minimum threshold paradigm, the new law expands 
congressional oversight of CFIUS’ reviews and investigations.240 The 
new law requires case-by-case notice to Congress.241 However, unlike 
the minimum threshold paradigm, the new law does not require notice at 
the initiation of reviews and investigation, and instead, limits these no-
tices to certifications at the completion of the first-stage review and sec-
ond-stage investigation.242 In addition, unlike the minimum threshold 
paradigm, the new law does not require CFIUS to notify the governor 
when a transaction involves critical infrastructure in that governor’s 
state.243 The new law, like the bill analyzed above, also modifies the cur-
rent law’s quadrennial report requirement to include an annual report.244 
By limiting notices to Congress to the concluding stage of the review and 
investigation and by removing the requirement to notify state governors, 
the new law strikes a better balance than the bill analyzed above by 
achieving increased public and congressional confidence in the thor-
oughness of review while limiting the potential for the damaging conse-
quences of unnecessary publicity and politicization.245 
In conclusion, the new law bears a striking resemblance to the mini-
mum threshold paradigm introduced by the bill analyzed in the body of 
this Note. The new law contains some important differences however, 
and as a consequence, it strikes a better balance between national secu-
rity and the principle of open investment. In particular, the provisions 
                                                                                                                                  
 236. See discussion supra Part V. 
 237. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 238. 121 Stat. 246 § 5(l)(1)–(3). 
 239. Id. § 5(l)(3)(B)(ii) & (l)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 
 240. Id. § 2(b)(3) (certifications to Congress) & § 7 (increased oversight by Congress). 
 241. Id. § 2(b)(3). 
 242. Id. 
 243. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 244. 121 Stat. 246 § 7(b). 
 245. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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that require the Secretary of the Treasury to provide guidance to inves-
tors regarding which transactions typically raise national security consid-
erations may allay the concerns of many foreign investors. On the other 
hand, the incorporation of homeland defense issues and critical infra-
structure into the definition of national security risks burdening individ-
ual transactions with the costs of larger U.S. security vulnerability that 
should be addressed through national security legislation like the ports 
security act discussed above. Whether the increased oversight by Con-
gress provided in the new law will be sufficient to restore public and 
congressional confidence while adequately circumscribing congressional 
involvement so as to avoid a repeat performance of the damaging con-
troversies that resulted in the unnecessary divestment of U.S. interests in 
both the DPW and Smartmatic transactions remains to be seen. 
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